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On 7 November 1999, something more than half the registered electors of Guatemala cast their 
votes in presidential, legislative, and municipal elections. Since the transition to democracy in 
the mid-1980s, Guatemala’s citizens have elected four governments — a record in a country with 
a history of long-lasting military dictatorships. Although turnout rates remain low, the 1999 
elections were free and fair. And despite the election of a populist candidate to the presidency, 
and one formerly aligned with the left, no military faction or business association protested the 
results. These elections may, then, confirm that competitive politics are here to stay in Guate-
mala. 
 
1. Constitutional reforms 
The 1996 Peace Accords had called for constitutional reforms to ensure that the agreements 
reached between the National Advancement Party (PAN) and the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Party (URNG) permanently altered Guatemala’s political landscape. The reforms 
included recognizing indigenous languages and customary law, de-militarizing the state, and 
improving democratic accountability. The Peace Accords recommended freezing the number of 
deputies, to ensure that the number of seats in the legislature did not expand at the same rate as 
the population. The peace negotiators also argued against allowing legislators to stand for 
election after two consecutive terms. Finally, they called for the formation of an electoral 
commission to reform the Law of Elections and Political Parties. 
 
According to the constitution, Congress must approve all constitutional amendments before 
submitting them for public approval. Not having an outright majority in Congress, President 
Arzú was forced to make several compromises to obtain the necessary two-thirds support. As the 
opposition, the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) initially conditioned its support for the 
reforms on elimination of the constitutional clause preventing former coup leaders — including 
FRG’s leader, Rios Montt — from standing for the presidency. Many PAN deputies, however, 
were uninterested in reform. Arguably, the party’s leadership backed reform principally because 
financial support from the international community was contingent upon fulfillment of the Peace 
Accords. 
 
After more than two years of negotiations, Congress approved a package of more than fifty 
reforms. Legislative logrolling resulted in the proliferation of amendments; in order to get the 
bill through, the PAN turned it into an omnibus bill pleasing as many different constituencies as 
possible. In a report issued in June 1998, the Electoral Reform Commission (consisting of 
members of Congress and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal) recommended against adopting term 
limits or capping the number of deputies. As finally approved by Congress, the bill contained a 
measure actually increasing the number of deputies to ensure that each department would have at 
least two representatives. 
 
To almost universal surprise, voters rejected the proposed reforms in the 16 May 1999 
referendum. The status quo was ratified by 55% to 45% (but with only 18.6% of registered 
electors casting a vote). The most heavily indigenous parts of the country voted in larger 
numbers and were typically in favour of reform. However, widespread expectation of success 
seems to have discouraged supporters of reform from mobilizing to counter a last-minute 
conservative drive to defeat the constitutional amendments.
1
 Had the institutional reforms simply 
been another issue in the 1999 election campaign, it seems very likely that they would have 
passed. 
 
The Electoral Reform Commission has also proposed a large number of other changes to existing 
electoral legislation.
2
 Several revolved around modernising the language of the law and 
eliminating potential inconsistencies. Among its more substantive proposals, the Commission 
called for overhauling the electoral registry to create a national, computer-based, photographic 
ID card system. A new study estimates that officials have not expunged the names of hundreds 
of thousands of citizens who have moved to the US or who have died. Its calculations suggest 
that the registry contains 25% more names than it should. The study also points out that 36.3% of 
eligible voters are not registered to vote — many more than previously thought.
3
 The Electoral 
Commission also recommended that polling stations be located throughout a municipality, not 
just in the municipal capital. As there is a significant (negative) relationship between 
municipality size and turnout, this particular reform may go a long way towards increasing 
political participation in Guatemala.
4
 However, as of mid-October 2000, the commission’s report 
remains stuck in committee and unapproved. 
 
2. Electoral laws 
According to the constitution, voters cast district-level and national-level ballots. In the 1985 and 
1990 elections, the parties’ shares of the vote in the first round of the presidential election 
determined the allocation of ―national deputies‖. In 1995, however, Congress approved enabling 
legislation for the Law of Elections and Political Parties requiring citizens to use a separate ballot 
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for national deputies. The number of national deputies is equivalent to 25% of all district 
deputies. In 1999, the 21 departments and the Metropolitan District of Guatemala City together 
elected 91 ―district deputies‖ to Congress. In national and district contests the d’Hondt method of 
proportional representation allocates seats to parties. The 1994 constitutional reforms also 
reduced the length of legislative terms from five to four years. The constitution does not limit the 
number of times deputies can be re-elected. Deputies are eligible to stand for re-election. 
 
Presidential elections are determined by an absolute majority. If no candidate wins an outright 
majority of the valid vote (total number of votes minus blank and null votes), the 1985 
constitution empowers the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to convene a runoff election between the 
two candidates with the largest shares of first-round votes. The 1994 constitutional reforms 
reduced the five-year executive term to four years, and prevented incumbents from running for 
re-election. 
 
3. Electoral campaign 
The principal candidates in the presidential election were Óscar Berger (PAN) and Alfonso 
Portillo (FRG). Like the incumbent president, Alvaro Arzú (PAN), Berger had become well 
known during two successful terms as mayor of Guatemala City. Having signed the 1996 Peace 
Accords with the guerrillas, and modernised the dilapidated road system, the PAN distinguished 
itself from the administrations led by Cerezo (1986–90), Serrano (1991–3), and Ramiro de León 
(1993–5). With the exception of de León — selected to complete Serrano’s term after the latter 
fled the country following his failure to elicit the support of the military to close Congress — 
Arzú’s predecessors had been accused of rampant corruption and authoritarian tendencies. 
Hence, at the start of the campaign, the PAN was confident that its less tainted reputation would 
deliver victory. 
 
For Portillo, the 1999 campaign was his second presidential bid. He had forced Arzú to a runoff 
in 1995, but thereafter tied his fortunes to the FRG. The party was led by (former) General Efrain 
Rios Montt, a charismatic, populist, and right-wing figure. Montt, however, was precluded from 
standing for high office: having come to power in a coup in 1982, the 1985 constitution barred 
him from becoming president. In a peculiar alliance between a former leftist and an ex-general 
accused of massive human rights abuses, the FRG ran what, in the end, turned out to be a 
successful electoral campaign. 
 
Both the PAN and the FRG started the campaign with similar levels of public support. In April 
1999, polling data
5
 show that the two parties were supported by 29% and 21% of the electorate, 
respectively. By October, the FRG had increased its support level to 46%. After six months of 




The answer seems to be that the FRG persuaded a majority of voters that it would be more likely 
to revive economic growth and to reduce crime, the two issues which Guatemalans professed to 
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care about the most.
7
 Although neither party openly attacked structural adjustment, the FRG 
managed to portray its rivals as the party of privilege. Most electors seem to have agreed: 
according to a December 1999 survey, 66% of respondents believed that another PAN 
administration would ―defend the interests of the rich‖.
8
 Both Rios Montt and Portillo came 
across as candidates more capable of dealing with crime. Since his days of leading military 
campaigns, Rios Montt had successfully cultivated his appeal as a law-and-order candidate. That 
Portillo had killed a man in self-defense while living in Mexico only reinforced perceptions that 
he, along with other FRG leaders, could solve the problem of crime. 
 
4. Election results 
In the first round of the presidential election, Alfonso Portillo won 47.7% of the vote to Berger’s 
30.3%. The remaining votes were split between nine other candidates, only one of whom 
achieved more than 4%. In the runoff election, held on 26 December, Portillo won 68.3% against 
Berger’s 31.7%. The final tallies for all the presidential candidates are shown in Table 1. 
 
In the legislative elections, out of the 113 seats, the FRG won 63 and the PAN 37. The New 
Nation Alliance–Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (ANN– UNRG), the party 
representing progressive groups and the former left-wing guerrillas, secured 9 seats. Three other 
parties shared the four remaining Congressional seats, one winner being the former Christian 
Democratic President, Vinicio Cerezo (1986–90). Table 2 summarises the results. 
 
5. Political challenges 
After decades of authoritarian rule, Guatemala faces severe social and economic problems. In the 
1990s, almost 40% of the population were struggling to survive on less than US$1 a day. In 
1997, life expectancy was 67 years; in 1998, 31% of the adult population was illiterate; and GDP 
per capita remains low (US$ 3,505). The UN Development Programme gave Guatemala 0.619 





Since the 1996 Peace Accords, politicians have accelerated investment in human 
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development. The PAN government had massively increased spending on infrastructure and 
social programs by the end of Arzú’s term in office. Yet spending on development remains 
limited because central government revenues amount to less than 10% of total GDP, placing 
Guatemala among the least-taxed countries in the world.
10
 Although the Peace Accords required 
the government to increase levels of taxation, that has not been implemented, partly due to the 
lack of administrative capacity but also owing to a tradition that deems taxes on property and 
income to be assaults on 
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individual rights. Tax reform is therefore enmeshed in seemingly endless legal disputes. 
Although reform has probably led to the more efficient use of public money in the 1990s, 
political and economic constraints limit the government’s ability to educate the population, to 
improve public health, and to invest in physical infrastructure. 
 
In a context of economic underdevelopment, state neglect leads to low levels of support for 
democracy in Guatemala. According to the 1996 Latinobarómetro, Guatemala’s citizens evaluate 
democracy less positively than in any of the other eighteen Latin American countries surveyed.
11
 
This helps to explain low turnout rates which, in turn, discourage public officials from 
addressing deep-seated inequalities; and then, in turn, the absence of effective public policies 
contributes to political apathy. The public’s lack of interest in politics seemingly encourages 
politicians to concentrate on jockeying for position, rather than on competing to outperform each 
other before a citizenry demanding accountability from its public officials. 
 
Despite its populist commitments, the new administration seems to be reverting to old practices. 
The press is full of reports of the competition for jobs and the perks of office between the 
portillista and the riosmontista factions of the FRG. By mid- 2000, the PAN had fallen apart; 
except for a handful (some eight or nine), most PAN deputies had formed a new party known as 
the Union Party. Given the government’s inability to stem crime, communities and groups 
throughout Guatemala continue to take justice into their own hands by burning or lynching 
                                                 
11
 Marta Lagos, 1997. Latin America’s Smiling Mask. Journal of Democracy 8, 125–138. 
criminal suspects. In early June 2000, in a move that may reactivate institutional reform and 
improve political accountability, FRG deputies called for the election of a Constituent Assembly 
to produce a new constitution. However, reform may yet again be stopped in its tracks by 
Portillo’s call to overturn the clause that prevents Rios Montt from running for high office. Faced 
with the possibility of the FRG leader’s election to the presidency, the opposition may unite to 
endorse the status quo. 
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